Files
LegacyHUB/docker-compose.teamhub.yml
Vadim Malanov d27dd0ffbb feat: align LegacyHUB with TeamHUB platform contract (D2/D4, assets, security)
Close 12 audit-driven platform-compliance gaps on a single branch.

- D4 dispatch: app/integrations/dispatch_client.py participant `legacyhub`,
  emits LegacyhubDocumentIndexed + AssetDerivativeReady after the indexing
  commit (idempotent uuid5), http_inbox route (reindex/tombstone) with
  audit-based dedupe; docs/dispatch-contract.md. Celery+Redis stays intra-module.
- D2 SSO: app/integrations/identity.py validates X-TeamHub-* + role/scope
  mapper; security.py adds trusted-header enforcement (AUTH_REQUIRE_IDENTITY)
  and a scope check on /search; docker-compose.teamhub.yml (external teamhub_net
  + internal db net, api not host-published); RUNBOOK network/firewall section.
- Asset standard: SearchHit/Citation carry asset_id/owner_module; buckets
  renamed teamhub-legacyhub-* (+quarantine/tmp/exports); purge-by-asset_id with
  legal-hold guard (app/indexing/projection.py); OCR-markdown derivative event.
- audit_log model + Alembic 0003 + record_audit on writes (same transaction).
- Secret masking: app/common/json_logger.py recursive mask wired into structlog
  (+ensure_ascii=False); event payloads redacted before persistence.
- Service X-API-Key mandatory on ingest endpoints (defence-in-depth).
- Port: host API 8000->8050 (collision with SalesHUB/MailHUB resolved),
  container still listens on 8000.
- Config: no plaintext secret defaults; fail-loud in non-dev (no value leak).
- Docs drift: README PG 5440, layered-auth note, 5173 removed from CORS;
  ingest/folder gated by ENABLE_FOLDER_INGEST (410 by default).
- ADRs: layers mapping, shared-core extraction, UI locale (RU-first).

Tests: 78 passing (ruff, compileall, pytest, tsc, vite build, compose config).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 11:44:15 +03:00

54 lines
1.5 KiB
YAML

# Federation overlay: run LegacyHUB behind the TeamHUB gateway on the shared
# `teamhub_net`. Compared with the standalone dev compose this overlay:
# - moves every backing service onto an internal-only network (no host ports);
# - reaches the api ONLY via `teamhub_net` (the gateway upstream), never
# directly from the host - so spoofing `X-TeamHub-*` is blocked by the network;
# - turns on trusted-header identity enforcement (AUTH_REQUIRE_IDENTITY).
#
# The shared network must exist first (created by TeamHUB-Platform infra):
# docker network create teamhub_net
#
# Usage (compose with prod hardening + this federation overlay):
# docker compose -f docker-compose.yml -f docker-compose.prod.yml \
# -f docker-compose.teamhub.yml --env-file .env.prod up -d --build
#
# See RUNBOOK.md "Network model & firewall" for the matching firewall rules.
networks:
teamhub_net:
external: true
name: teamhub_net
legacyhub_db:
internal: true
services:
postgres:
ports: !reset []
networks: [legacyhub_db]
minio:
ports: !reset []
networks: [legacyhub_db]
opensearch:
ports: !reset []
networks: [legacyhub_db]
qdrant:
ports: !reset []
networks: [legacyhub_db]
redis:
ports: !reset []
networks: [legacyhub_db]
api:
# Not published to the host: the gateway reaches the api over teamhub_net.
ports: !reset []
networks: [legacyhub_db, teamhub_net]
environment:
AUTH_REQUIRE_IDENTITY: "true"
worker:
networks: [legacyhub_db, teamhub_net]