Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Vadim Malanov
d27dd0ffbb feat: align LegacyHUB with TeamHUB platform contract (D2/D4, assets, security)
Close 12 audit-driven platform-compliance gaps on a single branch.

- D4 dispatch: app/integrations/dispatch_client.py participant `legacyhub`,
  emits LegacyhubDocumentIndexed + AssetDerivativeReady after the indexing
  commit (idempotent uuid5), http_inbox route (reindex/tombstone) with
  audit-based dedupe; docs/dispatch-contract.md. Celery+Redis stays intra-module.
- D2 SSO: app/integrations/identity.py validates X-TeamHub-* + role/scope
  mapper; security.py adds trusted-header enforcement (AUTH_REQUIRE_IDENTITY)
  and a scope check on /search; docker-compose.teamhub.yml (external teamhub_net
  + internal db net, api not host-published); RUNBOOK network/firewall section.
- Asset standard: SearchHit/Citation carry asset_id/owner_module; buckets
  renamed teamhub-legacyhub-* (+quarantine/tmp/exports); purge-by-asset_id with
  legal-hold guard (app/indexing/projection.py); OCR-markdown derivative event.
- audit_log model + Alembic 0003 + record_audit on writes (same transaction).
- Secret masking: app/common/json_logger.py recursive mask wired into structlog
  (+ensure_ascii=False); event payloads redacted before persistence.
- Service X-API-Key mandatory on ingest endpoints (defence-in-depth).
- Port: host API 8000->8050 (collision with SalesHUB/MailHUB resolved),
  container still listens on 8000.
- Config: no plaintext secret defaults; fail-loud in non-dev (no value leak).
- Docs drift: README PG 5440, layered-auth note, 5173 removed from CORS;
  ingest/folder gated by ENABLE_FOLDER_INGEST (410 by default).
- ADRs: layers mapping, shared-core extraction, UI locale (RU-first).

Tests: 78 passing (ruff, compileall, pytest, tsc, vite build, compose config).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-15 11:44:15 +03:00
Vadim Malanov
2e76554188 ci: align backend lint checks
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2026-06-14 20:14:49 +03:00
Vadim Malanov
24282d1279 feat(api): optional API-key auth middleware
Adds defence-in-depth shared-secret auth that activates when API_KEY
is set. Behaviour:

- empty API_KEY (dev default): every request allowed, middleware is
  not even installed;
- non-empty API_KEY: every request under APP_API_PREFIX except
  /health must carry X-API-Key: <value> or
  Authorization: Bearer <value>. /, /docs, /redoc, /openapi.json and
  CORS preflight stay open. hmac.compare_digest is used for the
  constant-time comparison.

The middleware resolves settings lazily so test fixtures can reload
app.config and have the new API_KEY take effect on the next install.

Tests (tests/test_api_security.py, 5 cases):
- /health remains open;
- protected route rejects missing key (401);
- protected route accepts X-API-Key header;
- protected route accepts Authorization: Bearer header;
- protected route rejects a wrong key.

Frontend:
- VITE_API_KEY env reads the key and Axios injects it on every
  request, falling back to no header when empty so SSO/reverse-proxy
  deployments stay unchanged.
- vite-env.d.ts adds the new env entry.

Docs/ops:
- .env.example documents the dev-default empty key;
- .env.prod.example marks API_KEY as a required rotation point;
- docker-compose.yml forwards API_KEY (defaults to empty);
- docker-compose.prod.yml fails the stack with ?:required when API_KEY
  is missing;
- RUNBOOK gains an API authentication section with header examples
  and the reverse-proxy + key layering recommendation.

pytest -q: 33 passed (5 new security + 28 prior).
npx tsc --noEmit: clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-13 17:17:27 +03:00