feat(api): optional API-key auth middleware
Adds defence-in-depth shared-secret auth that activates when API_KEY is set. Behaviour: - empty API_KEY (dev default): every request allowed, middleware is not even installed; - non-empty API_KEY: every request under APP_API_PREFIX except /health must carry X-API-Key: <value> or Authorization: Bearer <value>. /, /docs, /redoc, /openapi.json and CORS preflight stay open. hmac.compare_digest is used for the constant-time comparison. The middleware resolves settings lazily so test fixtures can reload app.config and have the new API_KEY take effect on the next install. Tests (tests/test_api_security.py, 5 cases): - /health remains open; - protected route rejects missing key (401); - protected route accepts X-API-Key header; - protected route accepts Authorization: Bearer header; - protected route rejects a wrong key. Frontend: - VITE_API_KEY env reads the key and Axios injects it on every request, falling back to no header when empty so SSO/reverse-proxy deployments stay unchanged. - vite-env.d.ts adds the new env entry. Docs/ops: - .env.example documents the dev-default empty key; - .env.prod.example marks API_KEY as a required rotation point; - docker-compose.yml forwards API_KEY (defaults to empty); - docker-compose.prod.yml fails the stack with ?:required when API_KEY is missing; - RUNBOOK gains an API authentication section with header examples and the reverse-proxy + key layering recommendation. pytest -q: 33 passed (5 new security + 28 prior). npx tsc --noEmit: clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -72,3 +72,6 @@ APP_API_PREFIX=/api/v1
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# Comma-separated list of allowed origins. NEVER use * in production.
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CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS=https://legacyhub.teamhub.example
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# Mandatory in production. Use a long random value (e.g. `openssl rand -hex 32`).
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API_KEY=__ROTATE_ME__
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